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How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, 
and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms 
Solve the “Lemons Problem” 
ADAM THIERER,* CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN,** ANNE HOBSON,*** AND 
CHRIS KUIPER**** 
This paper argues that the sharing economy—through 
the use of the Internet and real time reputational feedback 
mechanisms—is providing a solution to the lemons problem 
that many regulators have spent decades attempting to over-
come. Section I provides an overview of the sharing economy 
and traces its rapid growth. Section II revisits the lemons 
theory as well as the various regulatory solutions proposed 
to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. Section 
III discusses the relationship between reputation and trust 
and analyzes how reputational incentives affect commercial 
interactions. Section IV discusses how information asymme-
tries were addressed in the pre-Internet era. It also discusses 
how the evolution of both the Internet and information sys-
tems (especially the reputational feedback mechanisms of 
the sharing economy) addresses the lemons problem. Sec-
tion V explains how these new realities affect public policy 
and concludes that asymmetric information is not a legiti-
mate rationale for policy intervention in light of technologi-
cal changes. We also argue that continued use of this ra-
tionale to regulate in the name of consumer protection 
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A reputation for being “sound” is a valuable asset, 
and we should expect people to make every effort to 
get it. 
—Gordon Tullock1 
[C]ompetition is in a large measure competition for 
reputation or good will. 
—F. A. Hayek2 
One traditional argument for government regulation is that in-
formation deficiencies or “asymmetries” create market failures.3 In 
his oft-cited paper “The Market for Lemons,”4 George Akerlof de-
scribes why these information asymmetries prevent certain mutually 
beneficial exchanges from taking place. Analyzing the used car mar-
ket, Akerlof explains that used car buyers know that “lemons” exist 
but are unable to distinguish them from higher quality cars, and they 
are therefore less willing to pay.5 The buyers’ uncertainty, in turn, 
discourages sellers of higher-quality cars from offering their cars for 
sale, making both buyers and sellers worse off.6 
Akerlof provides several solutions to such information-based 
uncertainty, including guarantees, branding, chains, and licensing.7 
He notes, however, that while trust is important, if such trust-build-
ing mechanisms are lacking, the market will suffer.8 Many econo-
mists and public policymakers have since taken this idea of asym-
metric information as a chief justification for consumer protection 
regulations, such as food labels or product safety warnings.9 
                                                                                                             
 1 Gordon Tullock, Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 100 Q. J. 
ECON.1073, 1078 (Supp. 1985). 
 2 F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 109 (1948). 
 3 See SUSAN E. DUDLEY & JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 13 (2nd 
ed. 2012). 
 4 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 5 Id. at 489–90. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 499–500. 
 8 Id. at 500. 
 9 Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Pol-
icies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2222, 2222 n.20 (2012). 
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What is overlooked in much of the “lemons” literature and the 
corresponding policy debates is the fact that every information prob-
lem also represents an entrepreneurial opportunity.10 In fact, dis-
crepancies in information and dispersed knowledge drives economic 
activity by elucidating opportunities for entrepreneurs to broker rel-
evant information.11 Where information deficiencies or asymmetries 
exist, entrepreneurs typically seize the opportunity to offer im-
portant innovations.12 Trial-and-error experimentation and in-
creased rivalry lead to better ways of doing things and help to rem-
edy information deficiencies or asymmetries.13 
Importantly, reputational incentives and reputational feedback 
mechanisms have also increasingly helped market actors overcome 
information asymmetries.14 These mechanisms have always existed, 
but they were somewhat crude in the past. However, the Internet and 
information revolution have alleviated concerns about information 
deficiencies.15 With the recent explosion of the sharing economy, 
robust reputational feedback mechanisms now help consumers solve 
information problems and secure a greater voice in commercial in-
teractions.16 With the advent of the sharing economy, many of these 
mechanisms have been integrated into the platforms connecting 
buyers and sellers.17 
This paper argues that the sharing economy—through the use of 
the Internet and real time reputational feedback mechanisms—is 
providing a solution to the lemons problem that many regulators 
have spent decades attempting to overcome. Section I provides an 
overview of the sharing economy and traces its rapid growth. Sec-
tion II revisits the lemons theory as well as the various regulatory 
                                                                                                             
 10 See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 155 
(1973); see also Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The 
Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy 
Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 533 (2015). 
 11 KIRZNER, supra note 10, at 155. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Koopman et al., supra note 10, at 539. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 539–42. 
 17 Id. at 541. 
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solutions proposed to deal with the problem of asymmetric infor-
mation. Section III discusses the relationship between reputation 
and trust and analyzes how reputational incentives affect commer-
cial interactions. Section IV discusses how information asymmetries 
were addressed in the pre-Internet era. It also discusses how the evo-
lution of both the Internet and information systems (especially the 
reputational feedback mechanisms of the sharing economy) ad-
dresses the lemons problem. Section V explains how these new re-
alities affect public policy and concludes that asymmetric infor-
mation is not a legitimate rationale for policy intervention in light of 
technological changes. We also argue that continued use of this ra-
tionale to regulate in the name of consumer protection might, in fact, 
make consumers worse off. This has ramifications for the current 
debate over regulation of the sharing economy. 
I. THE RAPID EVOLUTION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 
Before discussing how reputational feedback systems help cre-
ate trust among economic actors in the modern economy and allevi-
ate earlier concerns about information asymmetries, it is important 
to define the nature and extent of recent innovations in the sharing 
economy. We begin by noting that definitions in this area continue 
to evolve rapidly. While “there is no universally accepted definition 
of the ‘sharing economy,’” Koopman, Mitchell, and Thierer argue 
that “it is helpful to think of the sharing economy” as a broader clas-
sification for any marketplace that uses the Internet to “bring[] to-
gether distributed networks of individuals to share or exchange oth-
erwise underutilized assets.”18 Defining the phenomenon in this way 
then “encompasses all manner of goods and services shared or ex-
changed for both monetary and nonmonetary benefit.”19 In this pa-
per, we will use the term in this manner. 
Regardless of the terms used to describe it, the market actors 
making up the sharing economy are radically transforming many as-
pects of the international economy. The sharing economy is gener-
ating an estimated $15 billion in global revenues today, and this 
                                                                                                             
 18 Id. at 531. 
 19 Id. 
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number is projected to grow to $335 billion by 2025.20 The sharing 
economy’s rental market for goods such as houses, cars, and ma-
chinery—dominated by firms such as Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and Re-
layRides—has an estimated worth in the tens of billions of dollars.21 
The ride-sharing market, which includes firms such as Uber and 
Lyft, and their respective valuations of $40 billion and $700 mil-
lion,22 is rapidly disrupting traditional taxi and transportation ser-
vices in cities across America, leading to a heated debate about its 
regulation.23 
The rapid ascendancy of the sharing economy challenges tradi-
tional economic theory and corresponding regulatory regimes in im-
portant ways. The sharing economy has brought about quick, radical 
changes to the ways individuals transact, and both regulators and 
economists are still trying to understand its impact.24 However, as 
Jason Tanz of Wired magazine notes, one clear consequence has 
already emerged.25 The sharing economy has resulted in greater trust 
between strangers, a precondition to successful economic exchange: 
“Many of these companies have us engaging in behaviors that would 
have seemed unthinkably foolhardy as recently as five years ago.”26 
                                                                                                             
 20 Ashley Kindergan, Credit Suisse: By 2025, Companies Could Rake in $335 
Billion a Year from People ‘Sharing’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2015, 7:13 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-suisse-sharing-economy-revenue-
335-billion-by-2025-2015-11; see also Koopman et al., supra note 10, at 530–31. 
 21 Koopman, supra note 10, at 530–31; Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Un-
stoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppa-
ble-rise-of-the-share-economy/. 
 22 Serena Saitto, Uber Valued at $40 Billion in $1.2 Billion Equity Funding, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
12-04/uber-valued-at-40-billion-with-1-2-billion-equity-fundraising.html; Doug-
las MacMillan & Evelyn M. Rusli, Ride-Sharing App Lyft Is Valued at More Than 
$700 Million, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 8, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/dig-
its/2014/03/08/ride-sharing-app-lyft-is-valued-at-more-than-700-million. 
 23 Brian Doherty, Smartphones vs. Taxi Drivers, REASON (Oct. 28, 2014, 8:30 
AM), http://reason.com/archives/2014/10/28/smartphones-vs-taxi-drivers. 
 24 Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each 
Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-
in-the-share-economy. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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This development has ramifications for both economic theory 
and public policy. Specifically, a growing reliance on reputational 
feedback systems in market transactions calls into question many of 
the current consumer protection regulations based on the lemons 
theory, as well as the notion that asymmetric information requires 
extensive government intervention in certain aspects of the econ-
omy. 
II. THE LEMONS PROBLEM REVISITED: AKERLOF’S THEORY AND 
SOME RESPONSES 
Traditionally, many economists have recognized that the diffi-
culty of distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in all types 
of transactions, and they have worried about the existence of infor-
mation asymmetries concerning quality between producers and con-
sumers as well as the resulting moral hazard problems. This concern 
was articulated most notably in 1970 by George A. Akerlof in The 
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism.27 Akerlof was eventually awarded a Nobel Prize for his con-
tributions to the economics of information.28 
Akerlof argues that when sellers have more information about 
products than the potential buyers, as, for example, in a used car 
market, then the lower quality cars (lemons) would crowd out those 
of higher quality because uncertainty among buyers would depress 
the average value of used cars.29 The lemons problem suggests that 
used cars tend to command a lower market price because potential 
buyers are unable to tell whether a used car is good or bad.30 As a 
consequence, sellers of higher-valued cars exit the market, and only 
lemons are offered.31 The market may eventually collapse because 
of this ongoing adverse selection process.32 Akerlof, describing the 
information problems inherent with purchasing a car in the 1970s, 
                                                                                                             
 27 Akerlof, supra note 4, at 488. 
 28 George A. Akerlof - Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.no-
belprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/akerlof-facts.html 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 29 Akerlof, supra note 4, at 489–90. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 490 
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concluded, “[i]t is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference be-
tween a good car and a bad car. . . . [or] even obtain the expected 
value of a new car.”33 Therefore, sellers have to accept low prices 
for higher-quality cars because buyers have trouble distinguishing 
between low and high-quality secondhand vehicles.34 
These information asymmetries also create moral hazard prob-
lems. In a transaction characterized by asymmetric information, the 
moral hazard is “the tendency of the better[-]informed party to ex-
ploit [these asymmetries] in an undesirable or dishonest way.”35 As 
George Akerlof observed, “dishonest dealings tend to drive honest 
dealings out of the market.”36 In particular, in addition to a dimin-
ished willingness to pay, there is an increased likelihood that sellers 
will exploit these information asymmetries to pass lemons off as 
plums, which will also drive plums—and honest sellers—out of the 
used car market.37 
It is important to note that Akerlof himself recognized the role 
that both government and private institutions could play to address 
information asymmetry: 
It should also be perceived that in these markets social and pri-
vate returns differ, and therefore, in some cases, governmental in-
tervention may increase the welfare of all parties. Or private institu-
tions may arise to take advantage of the potential increases in wel-
fare which can accrue to all parties.38 
While he admits that private institutions may arise, he discounts 
or disregards many historical examples of trust-based reputations 
mechanisms developed to overcome information asymmetries. He 
could predict neither the degree to which trust-based reputational 
mechanisms would continue to ameliorate the lemons problem nor 
the degree to which the entrepreneurial element would outperform 
formal government mechanisms. As we discuss below, the Internet, 
and the corresponding reputational feedback mechanisms that have 
                                                                                                             
 33 Id. at 489. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, The End of Asymmetric Information, CATO 
UNBOUND (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/06/alex-tabar-
rok-tyler-cowen/end-asymmetric-information. 
 36 Akerlof, supra note 4, at 495. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. at 488. 
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developed, lowers the costs of acquiring historically costly infor-
mation prior to engaging in what would otherwise be uncertain 
transactions, resolving much of Akerlof’s lemons problem. 
Since its publication in 1970, many economists have come to 
challenge some of the central conclusions drawn from Akerlof’s pa-
per. For example, in response to the claim that information asym-
metries can result in the failure of markets, George Mason Univer-
sity economist Dan Klein argues that “[f]reedom to engage in self-
disclosure and competitive exposé is one of the freedoms that make 
just the reverse true.”39 Within markets, solutions to information 
asymmetries often emerge. Leveraging feedback mechanisms to 
garner relevant information, building a reputation, and extending 
trust based on the reputations of others can crowd out those ex-
changes based on information uncertainty.40 
Building on Akerlof’s lemons problem, others have argued that 
these information asymmetries lead to distortions in people’s behav-
iors, and “to the extent that parties are misinformed or uninformed, 
they are less likely to be able to behave in accord with their true 
preferences, and hence the market fails.”41 Others, however, have 
come to realize that dispersed knowledge may not contribute to 
these feared outcomes to the extent that many believed decades ago. 
Nobel Prize–winning economist Vernon Smith, for example, recog-
nized that dispersed knowledge is the driving force of exchange and 
innovation.42 He notes, 
“[M]arkets” are about recognizing that information is dispersed 
in all social systems, and that the problem of society is to find, de-
vise and discover institutions that incentivize and enable people to 
make the right decisions without anyone having to tell them what to 
do.43 
                                                                                                             
 39 Daniel B. Klein, Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and 
Safety, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD 
CONDUCT 97, 120 (Daniel B. Klein ed., 2000). 
 40 See Koopman, supra note 10, at 541. 
 41 R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of 
an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 
635, 640 (1996). 
 42 RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF GOVERNMENT 
FAILURE 7 (2011). 
 43 Id. 
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It is important to analyze the performance of formal and infor-
mal institutions in the coordination of this dispersed, asymmetric in-
formation in order to shape policy decisions regarding the emerging 
sharing economy. By definition, dispersed knowledge creates infor-
mation asymmetries; however, markets also incentivize entrepre-
neurs to develop mechanisms to coordinate this dispersed 
knowledge.44 Section III will focus on some of the Internet-based 
mechanisms that have arisen to fulfill this role. 
Furthermore, much of the current application of the lemons 
problem does not emphasize the importance of incentives facing 
both the consumer and the buyer. As Nobel Prize–winning econo-
mist George Stigler demonstrated, buyers will seek all information 
available to them up until the point that the search costs exceed the 
value of the information.45 Many regulations concerning the lemons 
problem ignore the fact that buyers demand relevant information 
and thus provide the incentive for feedback mechanisms to arise in 
the long run. The buyer has a strong incentive to get as much infor-
mation about a product as possible.46 Ways the buyer can acquire 
this information include consulting a third party for external verifi-
cation, seeking out a reputable seller, bringing a knowledgeable 
friend along, or conducting the research themselves. Entrepreneurs 
are incentivized to facilitate these mechanisms.47 
Akerlof underestimated the power of the incentives facing en-
trepreneurs as well. In his view, “[t]he problem, of course, is that 
entrepreneurship [in identifying quality] may be a scarce resource; 
no development text leaves entrepreneurship unemphasized.”48 The 
degree to which the entrepreneur can address information asymme-
tries in the context of online reputational mechanisms has called into 
question whether the lemons problem will persist.49 
                                                                                                             
 44 See Koopman, supra note 10, at 533. 
 45 George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216 
(1961). 
 46 See Akerlof, supra note 4, at 495. 
 47 See Koopman, supra note 10, at 533. 
 48 Akerlof, supra note 4, at 496. 
 49 See Koopman, supra note 10, 539–44; Mark Steckbeck & Peter Boettke, 
Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Entrepreneurial Solutions to Adverse Selection 
Problems in E-Commerce, in MARKETS, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION: 
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Finally, Peter Boettke and Mark Steckbeck argue that the fear of 
information asymmetries ignores the robustness of markets, and that 
markets continue to function even when the underlying conditions 
are not ideal.50 And ultimately, as Nobel Prize–winning economist 
Friedrich Hayek notes, market failures may well be corrected by 
competitive solutions and private institutions.51 We argue that a pri-
vate market solution has presented itself in the form of the infor-
mation revolution, online reputational and trust-building mecha-
nisms, and the lower search costs of an interconnected world. There-
fore, government interventions justified on the basis of information 
asymmetries must be reevaluated. When this view of competition—
held also by Israel Kirzner and Ludwig von Mises—is adopted, in-
formation asymmetry is not a market failure, but rather a market 
opportunity.52 
III. TRUST, REPUTATION, NORMS, AND MARKET DYNAMISM: 
HISTORICAL RESPONSES TO INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
“Akerlof’s premise is correct in that” human nature will produce 
suboptimal behavior when there is a lack of any effective and effi-
cient mechanism to induce cooperation among buyers and sellers.53 
However, Akerlof’s model failed to adequately account for the 
emergent use of mechanisms such as trust and reputation, as well as 
social norms, to ameliorate the coordination failure resulting from 
such asymmetries.54 In this section, we discuss how social norms, 
trust, and reputation have been used throughout history to lay the 
foundation for economic exchange. 
                                                                                                             
AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERNET ECONOMY 218, 219 (Jack Birner & 
Pierre Garrouste eds., 2004). 
 50 Steckbeck & Boettke, supra note 49, at 219. 
 51 Id. at 219–20; see generally HAYEK, supra note 2, at 97. 
 52 See, for example, KIRZNER, supra note 10, at 217; see generally LUDGWIG 
VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 275–76, 278–79 (Bet-
tina Bien Greaves ed., 2010); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE 
PRICE SYSTEM 14, 115 (Peter J Boettke & Frédéric Sautet eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY]. 
 53 See Steckbeck & Boettke, supra note 49, at 221. 
 54 Id. at 218–19. 
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A.   The Relationship between Reputation and Trust: From the 
Maghribi Traders to the New York Diamond Trade 
As Hayek explains in The Use of Knowledge in Society, the fun-
damental economic problem society faces is the question of how to 
achieve cooperation between individuals with dispersed, and often 
asymmetric, knowledge.55 Market actors use trust and reputational 
mechanisms to facilitate transactions.56 In transactions among im-
personal agents, trust becomes an even more crucial component of 
cooperation because “a buyer’s trust in a seller’s credibility reduces 
perceived transaction-specific risks, allowing the seller to obtain 
price premiums.”57 And devising trust-based reputational mecha-
nisms throughout history has allowed for a greater volume of effi-
cient transactions between impersonal agents over a wider variety 
of lower-cost goods and across geographic, linguistic, and cultural 
barriers.58 These mechanisms can also complement or act as a sub-
stitute for formal enforcement mechanisms. 
The use of trust and reputation to overcome information asym-
metries can be traced at least as far back as the 11th century.59 A 
group of Mediterranean traders, known as the Maghribi traders, pro-
vide one example of how groups have found their own solutions to 
the problems of asymmetric information.60 The Maghribi traders op-
erated throughout the Mediterranean, achieving efficiency by using 
agents rather than traveling themselves.61 However, they also faced 
                                                                                                             
 55 F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 
519–20 (1945). 
 56 See Sulin Ba & Paul A. Pavlou, Evidence of the Effect of Trust Building 
Technology in Electronic Markets: Price Premiums and Buyer Behavior, 26 MIS 
Q. 243, 244–48 (2002). 
 57 Ba & Pavlou, supra note 56, at 248. 
 58 See, e.g., Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evi-
dence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989) [hereinafter Greif, 
Reputation and Coalitions] (examining “the ‘coalition,’ an economic institution 
based upon a reputation mechanism utilized by Mediterranean traders [during the 
eleventh century] to confront the organizational problem associated with the ex-
change relations between merchants and their overseas agents”). 
 59 See id. at 858–59; Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic In-
stitutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 
525, 528, 530 (1993) [hereinafter Greif, Contract Enforceability]. 
 60 See Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 58, at 863. 
 61 Id. 
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asymmetric information and moral hazard problems (i.e., it was easy 
for these agents to abscond with the capital or cheat the merchants 
as they operated in far-off markets) that could not be remedied 
through the existing legal system.62 As a result, these traders built 
reputational mechanisms that allowed them to condition future em-
ployment on past conduct, and they ostracized those who cheated 
through concerted refusals to deal by the entire network of traders.63 
These reputational mechanisms worked because they allowed the 
traders to rely on the credible past experiences of others to help them 
determine with whom they would deal in the future.64 In the context 
of recurring transactions, those with positive reputations were re-
warded with increased business and those with negative reputations 
were not.65 
The role that trust and reputation play in ordering social cooper-
ation has always been an important, but often overlooked, factor in 
how the market process actually works.66 Various forms of reputa-
tional mechanisms have developed in order for people to more effi-
ciently communicate judgments and experiences with one another, 
and to make decisions about whom to trust and what to believe.67 As 
Adam Smith observed in 1759 in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
“[w]e desire both to be respectable and to be respected,” and peo-
ple’s success in life, he continued, “almost always depends upon the 
favour and good opinion of their neighbours and equals; and without 
a tolerably regular conduct, these can very seldom be obtained. The 
good old proverb, therefore, that honesty is the best policy, holds, in 
such situations, almost always perfectly true.”68 Roughly 225 years 
later, Gordon Tullock remarked, 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. at 862–63. 
 63 Id. at 868. 
 64 Id. at 869. 
 65 Id. at 868; see Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 59, at 530. 
 66 See Paolo Massa, Trust It Forward: Tyranny of the Majority or Echo 
Chambers?, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE 
RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 151, 151–52 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey 
eds., 2011) (“Trust is a key element for society. Without trust, society could not 
exist [] . . . .[T]rust has been shown to be positively correlated with economic 
growth, well-being, and happiness, and negatively correlated with crime and cor-
ruption.”). 
 67 See id. at 159. 
 68 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 84, 86 (1853 ed. 
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A reputation for being “sound” is a valuable asset, and we should 
expect people to make every effort to get it . . . .Where the market is 
broad and there are many alternatives, you had better cooperate. If 
you choose the noncooperative solution, you may find you have no 
one to noncooperate with.69 
Indeed, many voluntary trade associations continue to play a role 
in providing trust-based reputational mechanisms.70 For example, 
the New York Diamond Dealers Club—created in the early 20th 
century—includes a rigorous admission process, an arbitration pro-
cess with industry experts, and high standards for maintaining mem-
bership.71 Similar associations use coordinated refusals to deal in 
order to sustain valuable reputational mechanisms.72 Merchants re-
fuse to enter into contracts with dishonest firms and demand a risk 
premium from those who have not lived up to their contracts.73 
Many of these reputational mechanisms are horizontal restraints, 
designed to address deficiencies in formal institutions (i.e., courts) 
by threatening group boycotts of dishonest firms.74 Thus, the credi-
ble threat of coordinated punishment serves as a reputation-based 
mechanism for ensuring fair dealing.75 The commercial negotiation 
process across industries has facilitated the transfer of information 
between cooperating parties. Over time, this process has been aug-
mented to incorporate security deposits or collateral that can serve 
in lieu of forthcoming trust.76 
Reputation, then, is an essential factor in building trust among 
others within the market; ultimately it allows for greater specializa-
tion of trade.77 Voluntary cooperation of both a commercial and 
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noncommercial nature is far more likely to take place when the par-
ties involved in the transactions have a reasonable expectation that 
they can trust the other parties to live up to their ends of the deal.78 
Klein notes, howver, that interactions can be structured to lessen de-
pendence on trust and increase the likelihood that a party will per-
form what they’ve promised.79 Thus trust and reputation can be “a 
catalyst in many buyer-seller transactions, and it can provide buyers 
with high expectations of satisfying exchange relationships.”80 Trust 
is defined as “a disposition to engage in social exchanges that in-
volve uncertainty and vulnerability, but that are also potentially re-
warding.”81 In this way, trust is essential to the market process. It 
depends on a person’s history of economic behavior and an under-
standing of his or her incentives for future cooperation.82 Trust acts 
as an indicator of the future behavior of economic actors.83 
Not everyone has adopted the view that reputation is an effective 
means for inducing efficient market cooperation. Kenneth Arrow, 
for example, has countered the claim that trust could serve as an ef-
fective economic asset or signal by describing trust and similar val-
ues, such as loyalty or truth telling, as externalities.84 He argues that 
reputation and trust are not commodities that can be openly traded 
on the market in any technically possible way.85 Daniel Klein, how-
ever, points out that there are entire services, such as the Better Busi-
ness Bureau, that indeed make money by providing reputational 
links.86 There is, in effect, a literal market for information. 
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Arrow is certainly correct that trust is not openly traded like 
other commodities.87 His arguments, however, miss the deeper co-
ordination mechanisms at work. Reputational systems need not op-
erate like a literal stock market to fulfill an invaluable social func-
tion. Trust remains an important asset that incentivizes particular 
behaviors by both buyers and sellers.88 In particular, once an indi-
vidual or firm “has established a solid reputation,” the risk of infor-
mation asymmetry is no longer as costly to consumers.89 Basing de-
cisions on a reputation may create a greater willingness among con-
sumers to engage in transactions that might have been previously 
considered too risky.90 
The lemons problem is alleviated when buyers are able to rely 
on the solid reputations of certain sellers to provide high-quality 
products.91 Eric Goldman details how reputation and reputational 
systems help solve asymmetric information problems and smooth 
the market process by acting as a secondary invisible hand: 
When information about producers and vendors is costly, repu-
tational information can improve the operation of the invisible hand 
by helping consumers make better decisions. In this case, reputa-
tional information acts like an invisible hand of the invisible hand 
(an effect I call the secondary invisible hand) because reputational 
information can guide consumers to make marketplace choices that 
in aggregate enable the invisible hand. Thus, in an information econ-
omy with transaction costs, reputational information can play an es-
sential role in rewarding good producers and punishing poor ones.92 
Indeed, by lowering the transaction costs of decision making and 
information gathering, reputational mechanisms allow for more eco-
nomic activity at the margin and promote innovation and further 
gains from exchange.93 When the costs of acquiring information are 
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reduced, and “the costs of making decisions and trades are reduced, 
new opportunities can be [sought out and] exploited.”94 
“Reputation, or the fear of its loss,” can act as a powerful incen-
tive to both “constrain[] opportunistic behavior” and incentivize 
honest transactions among individuals within the market.95 Reputa-
tion aids private institutions in overcoming asymmetric information 
problems.96 Reputational constraints, like “religious or ethical con-
straints,” prevent individuals from lying and cheating by making 
such behavior “very costly” in the market.97 
As noted in the examples of the Maghribi traders and the Dia-
mond Dealers Club, reneging on a promise puts one’s reputation—
and future income—at risk.98 Likewise, individuals are rewarded for 
honest dealings.99 Reputation elicits cooperation, acts as an enforce-
ment mechanism, signals trustworthiness or quality, mitigates risks, 
incentivizes good behavior, punishes bad behavior, and aids in re-
solving information asymmetry.100 Social norms also work to com-
plement reputation in regulating human behavior.101 
B.   The Relationship between Reputation and Social Norms: 
Shasta County, California 
The use of reputational mechanisms also plays a much deeper 
role in how individual actions are coordinated. Cass Sunstein argues 
that “[s]ocial norms are a key determinant in [the] reputational ben-
efit[s] or cost[s]” of individual actions.102 Sunstein defines norms as 
“social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought 
to be done and what ought not to be done.”103 These social norms, 
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and corresponding social sanctions, often act as powerful regulators 
of behavior.104 Sunstein notes, 
[S]ocial norms are enforced through social sanc-
tions  . . . .[These] sanctions create a range of unpleasant (but some-
times pleasant) emotional states in [the minds of] people who have 
violated norms. If someone behaves in a way inconsistent with so-
cial norms, public disapproval may produce embarrassment or per-
haps shame and a desire to hide.105 
And, as Sunstein explains, the costs of violating social norms 
can be quite high because the unpleasant feelings brought about are 
intense, and the social consequences can be profound.106 In some 
cases, norms rather than formal legal rules dictate how individuals 
will interact with one another.107 
As Robert Ellickson famously observed in Shasta County, Cali-
fornia, legal rule had no effect at all on the behavior of ranchers and 
farmers with regard to liability for straying cattle in the mid-20th 
century.108 Interactions among these neighbors were controlled by a 
system of norms: a code having no connection to courts, legislatures, 
or any other formal institution.109 As David Friedman explains, 
When informed that one of his animals was trespassing, a 
rancher is expected to apologize, retrieve the animal, and take rea-
sonable precautions to keep it from happening again. If significant 
damage has been done, the animal’s owner is expected to make up 
for the damage. . . . If a rancher consistently lets his animals stray, 
or fails to offer to make up for significant damages, the victim re-
sponds with gossip—spreading the word that the rancher is not be-
having in a proper neighborly way. If that fails to work, the victim 
may transport straying animals far away—imposing significant 
costs on the owner who has to retrieve them.110 
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Christine Bicchieri refers to these arrangements as “covenants 
without swords.”111 She explains that “covenants are made and kept 
even in the absence of obvious sanctions. The very act of promising 
. . . might be enough to induce many of us to behave contrary to 
narrow self-interest. A social norm has been activated, and, under 
the right circumstances, we are prepared to follow it.”112 Bicchieri 
goes so far as to call social norms “the grammar of society”: 
[L]ike a collection of linguistic rules that are implicit in a lan-
guage and define it, social norms are implicit in the operations of a 
society and make it what it is. Like a grammar, a system of norms 
specifies what is acceptable and what is not in a social group. And 
analogously to a grammar, a system of norms is not the product of 
human design and planning.113 
Thus, whether they are born out of an obligation to keep prom-
ises, or to avoid punishment or social sanction, norms act as a pow-
erful check on opportunistic behavior.114 
And, much like the reputational mechanisms discussed above, 
certain social norms can aid economic cooperation by rewarding 
good behavior and sanctioning the bad.115 Bicchieri explains, “So-
cial norms . . . often go against narrow self-interest, as when we are 
required to cooperate, reciprocate, act fairly, or do anything that may 
involve some material cost or the forgoing of some benefit.”116 
These kinds of beneficial social norms work not only in those situa-
tions where there is a conflict of interest, but also in situations where 
there is the potential for joint gain.117 
Alongside reputational mechanisms, social norms lead to con-
sistent behavioral patterns.118 In creating these patterns, norms allow 
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individuals to develop expectations about another’s behavior and al-
low market actors to make predictions about quality in the face of 
asymmetric information.119 This facilitates ongoing economic coop-
eration and allows more of the mutually beneficial exchanges that 
ameliorate the lemons problem.120 
C.   Dynamic Competition and the Forgotten Entrepreneurial 
Element: Modern Pre-Internet Solutions to Information 
Asymmetries 
While the role of reputation and social norms in commercial in-
teractions may seem self-evident, the traditional “lemons problem” 
downplays the potential for greater trust to develop among market 
participants because asymmetric information problems will con-
tinue to persist.121 Yet, while the Internet has allowed for more trust 
mechanisms and reputation-building than anyone could have pre-
dicted, the market has also been devising solutions to asymmetric 
information problems.122 
The driving force behind the rise of these mechanisms to solve 
information asymmetry is the alertness of the entrepreneur to emerg-
ing market opportunities.123 Markets are not static; they are a dy-
namic process.124 And every perceived information problem also 
creates an incentive for the entrepreneur to discover new ways to 
create profit opportunities.125 By continually updating information 
and experimenting through trial and error, the entrepreneur discov-
ers more efficient means of promoting human interaction and facil-
itating exchange.126 Ultimately, as the entrepreneur takes advantage 
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of these opportunities, the market process is driven toward equilib-
rium.127 
In other words, information asymmetries represent entrepre-
neurial opportunities.128 As Hayek explains, 
In actual life the fact that our inadequate knowledge 
of the available commodities or services is made up 
for by our experience with the persons or firms sup-
plying them—that competition is in a large measure 
competition for reputation or good will—is one of 
the most important facts which enables us to solve 
our daily problems. The function of competition is 
here precisely to teach us who will serve us well.129 
Indeed, dynamic competition allows consumers to distinguish 
between those who will perform and those who will fail.130 It also 
creates a strong financial incentive for individuals to overcome 
problems and realize gains from exchange.131 Today’s market fail-
ures are simply tomorrow’s profit opportunities, and it is the dyna-
mism of the market process that allows entrepreneurs to discover 
how best to achieve the solutions.132 
Even before the Internet and many other modern forms of infor-
mation sharing discussed in the next section, individuals sought in-
formation regarding potential buyers and sellers, using various 
methods to acquire the information they lacked.133 In response, the 
market provided several reputational mechanisms, including meth-
ods as simple as getting to know people, reviewing prices, seeking 
referrals, viewing “credentials and seals of approval,” participating 
in a service trial, asking for a guarantee or a warranty, consulting a 
neighbor or a third party, getting a second opinion, consulting “an 
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information bureau or a rating organization,” trusting a middleman, 
or doing their own research.134 
Traditionally, one of the core functions of prices has been to 
communicate the relative valuation of goods and products on the 
market.135 Hayek explains that “in a system where the knowledge of 
the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to 
coordinate the separate actions of different people.”136 Oftentimes, 
buyers and sellers can use relative prices to understand a great deal 
of information about the product or service in question without 
needing to rely on costly searching methods.137 
Akerlof suggests two counteracting institutions—guarantees 
and brand names—that buyers use to derive information about prod-
ucts.138 These institutions have developed to allow higher-quality 
products to compete with the lemons.139 Akerlof notes that “brand 
names not only indicate quality but also give the consumer a means 
of retaliation if the quality does not meet expectations.”140 This is 
certainly true in the way consumers will make concerted efforts to 
avoid particular brands for political, moral, and ethical reasons.141 
In addition, like brand names, franchising extends trust over a net-
work of associated services with a common reputation.142 Guaran-
tees, warranties, and return policies help negate the effects of quality 
uncertainty.143 These are institutions in which the risk is born by the 
seller rather than by the buyer.144 
Advertising is another way that relevant information is commu-
nicated to buyers.145 Stigler explains that, as a method of providing 
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potential buyers with knowledge of the identity, and thus reputation, 
of potential sellers, advertising is “an immensely powerful instru-
ment for the elimination of ignorance.”146 Advertising can help ed-
ucate consumers about the options at their disposal and about the 
relative merits of each option.147 
In addition to these mechanisms, the 20th century saw the rise 
of third-party organizations that collect and disseminate information 
to consumers, thus alleviating information asymmetry among buy-
ers. Independent reviewers and watchdog groups grew to collect in-
formation about quality for interested parties, and they developed 
effective means for communicating this information to those seek-
ing it. Examples include consumer advocacy groups such as the 
Consumers Union,148 the Better Business Bureau,149 and the Na-
tional Consumers League;150 expert industry consultant services 
such as the American Automobile Association (AAA);151 special-
ized product magazines and guides like Edmunds,152 Carfax,153 and 
Kelley Blue Book154 for cars; and various other local product and 
service reviewers. Many specialized information services related to 
the car industry existed at the time Akerlof first explained the lem-
ons problem.155 And approximately two decades after Akerlof de-
scribed what he saw as major information asymmetries within the 
market, Carfax began providing its car reports.156 
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Other third-party mechanisms used buyers as a source of infor-
mation. For example, in the early 1990s, Prologue, a service of Con-
sumer Health Services, connected people with medical practitioners 
by mail and telephone.157 It relied on the feedback mechanism of 
users filling out response cards in order to rate doctors.158 Prologue 
used this information to recommend and refer customers to the best 
doctors.159 Modern equivalents such as Zocdoc160 or WebMD161 
continue to provide Internet-based referral services linking consum-
ers to medical professionals based on their reputations. 
As the market continues to grow in both the number of transac-
tions and the number of economic actors, Stigler has predicted that 
many of these firms will appear to collect costly information and sell 
it to those who would otherwise be unable to acquire the information 
in a cost-effective way.162 
In addition to these information dealers, private certification and 
accreditation bodies also act as signals about the quality of products 
and services. For example, the Good Housekeeping Seal of Ap-
proval reveals information about the reliability of household prod-
ucts.163 Editor’s Choice awards signal the high quality of consumer 
electronics products.164 Other third-party accreditation organiza-
tions include Moody’s credit rating services, and J. D. Power ratings 
on consumer goods.165 
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Labels also reveal information about reputation.166 Labels serve 
as “mechanism[s] or institution[s] which systematically process[] 
some information among community members.”167 One of the most 
prevalent examples of this is Underwriters Laboratories, which be-
gan in 1901 as a safety certification company providing on-site 
safety inspections both for factories and security systems, as well as 
aiding in the development of product standards.168 By certifying 
tested products with the UL label, Underwriters Laboratories has 
become one of the best means of communicating desirable infor-
mation to consumers regarding the merit of appliances and devices. 
This information would otherwise have needed to be acquired 
through costly means.169 
Of course, there will always be some friction in the market pro-
cess because some degree of information asymmetry will always be 
present in an imperfect world.170 In fact, as Stigler demonstrates, in-
dividuals will only continue to search for information so long as the 
marginal cost of each item exceeds the marginal benefit of pos-
sessing it.171 Invariably, there will be instances in which people will 
remain uninformed.172 As Hayek explains, this is the “phenomena 
with which we have to deal: the unavoidable imperfection of man’s 
knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which 
knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired.”173 Ulti-
mately, as entrepreneurs discover new and effective ways to over-
come these information gaps, information asymmetries between po-
tential buyers and sellers will decrease as well.174 
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IV. HOW THE INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SOLVE OLD 
PROBLEMS 
As noted above, markets are a dynamic—or evolutionary—pro-
cess, where both established and emergent standards, tools, and 
mechanisms deemed efficient today will nonetheless be supplanted 
by newer, more efficient means tomorrow.175 And the market pro-
cess emerges from trial-and-error experimentations, as entrepre-
neurs “discover more efficient means of promoting human interac-
tion, thus facilitating exchange.”176 This same process has taken 
place with the rise of the Internet and subsequent developments in 
how information systems are used to solve old problems.177 Ongo-
ing experimentation with online technologies and feedback systems 
has helped alleviate information asymmetries.178 
A.   Early Internet Reputational Feedback Mechanisms 
As previously discussed, reputational feedback mechanisms in 
the form of product and service reviews, ratings, and awards have 
existed for some time. With the advent of the Internet, many of these 
services simply moved online, leveraging a wider audience and con-
tinuing to lower the transaction costs associated with acquiring per-
tinent information. For example, Consumer Reports still publishes 
its print magazine, but all the reviews and ratings can now be found 
online as well.179 Other product review sites are exclusively online; 
one example is CNET, which primarily reviews electronics, soft-
ware, and other technology products.180 
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The next evolution in online feedback mechanisms was 
prompted by average consumers—as opposed to professionals—rat-
ing products and services online.181 As Liangjun You and Riyaz Si-
kora note, “[o]nline opinion and consumer-review sites have dra-
matically changed the way consumers shop, enhancing or even sup-
planting traditional sources of consumer information such as adver-
tising.”182 One of the largest sites utilizing online product feedback 
is Amazon.com, where buyers rate individual items with a simple 
five-star system as well as detailed reviews.183 These rating systems 
have evolved into service review platforms such as Yelp, which al-
low customers to comment on and rate local businesses.184 Like-
wise, this has led to platforms such as TripAdvisor that provide a 
forum where travelers offer tips and ratings for specific travel sites, 
tourist spots, and hotels.185 Review and rating sites allow both pro-
fessionals and amateurs to rate goods and services on platforms re-
lated to either general or hyper-specific interests.186 These sites per-
form the vital function of providing consumers with the information 
they need before they engage in an exchange.187 
The latest major evolution of online feedback mechanisms is the 
two-way or interactive rating system, which was popularized by 
eBay.188 While a one-way rating system is sufficient to decide which 
item to buy on Amazon, it is not sufficient when interacting with 
another unknown party, especially an individual rather than a com-
pany. Both eBay buyers and sellers have the option of leaving feed-
back for each other after a transaction, giving a positive, neutral, or 
negative rating along with a short comment.189 Over time, eBay 
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members develop a feedback profile, that is, a reputation score based 
on other people’s comments and ratings.190 This is one of the most 
powerful parts of sellers’ eBay profiles, and it can determine how 
easily or at how high a price they can sell items.191 In fact, reputa-
tional systems have been found to both help avoid fraud and increase 
buyer satisfaction.192 Moreover, Kevin Hoffman, David Zage, and 
Cristina Nita-Rotaru note that “[n]ot only do reputation systems help 
protect the buyer, but they have also been shown to reduce transac-
tion-specific risks and therefore generate price premiums for repu-
table sellers.”193 Conversely, in some instances, sellers can demand 
assurances from buyers with poor ratings with regard to their ability 
to pay.194 It is these simple feedback systems that allow communi-
ties like eBay not only to operate but to thrive.195 Others also note 
that 
feedback systems, or reputation mechanisms, in-
crease trust and trustworthiness among strangers en-
gaging in commercial transactions. They provide 
summarized histories of past behaviour, increasing 
the opportunities of well-behaved participants, and 
decreasing those of poorly-behaved ones. They thus 
improve trust by rewarding cooperation.”196 
The next section will explain how reputational systems have 
grown even more sophisticated with the recent rise of the sharing 
economy. 
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B.   Rise of the Sharing Economy and New Reputational Feedback 
Mechanisms 
The market for reputational mechanisms is active, robust, and 
always adapting to new challenges. The sharing economy has 
caused the development of new mechanisms at the same time old 
ones have adapted to technological change. There are two general 
types of online reputational mechanisms: centralized or third-party 
mechanisms, and peer-to-peer mechanisms.197 They will be exam-
ined in order. 
As Audun Jøsang, Roslan Ismail, and Colin Boyd note, trust and 
reputation schemes cover a wide variety of applications and utilize 
many different types of mechanisms.198 Therefore, “there is no sin-
gle solution that will be suitable in all contexts and applications.”199 
The key is to allow these mechanisms to compete in the market.200 
Just as a competitive market in any other good or service will pro-
duce the most efficient result, a competitive market in online repu-
tational mechanisms will allow those that provide the most accurate 
or efficient mechanism to develop.201 
1.   CENTRALIZED OR THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS 
These mechanisms build trust in the centralized platform but not 
necessarily trust between the two transacting parties. For example, 
eBay has a money back guarantee that refunds buyers if they don’t 
receive their item or the item they receive does not match the listing 
description.202 This mechanism does not increase the buyer’s trust 
in the actual seller, nor does it increase the seller’s personal reputa-
tion, but it does increase the level of comfort in the transaction.203 In 
other words, the platform facilitating the transaction doesn’t merely 
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connect buyers and sellers; it also acts as a third party seeking to add 
trust and validity to the transactions.204 In contrast, an example of a 
platform that only connects buyer and seller, offering no additional 
value or assurance services, is Craigslist, the virtual equivalent of 
the classifieds in traditional print newspapers.205 
While eBay and Airbnb started primarily as a simple service-
listing platform, it soon became evident to both that adding services 
and mechanisms to enhance trust in the transaction would be valua-
ble to both parties. This frees people from having to critically eval-
uate each individual with whom they interact, thus lowering trans-
action costs. What these systems have in common is that they radi-
cally lower transaction costs by making hassle-free cooperation 
among diverse parties easier than ever. 
As previously mentioned, guarantees by centralized platforms 
are fairly common. These are similar to the guarantees discussed 
earlier where a party offers to refund the purchase price if the buyer 
is unsatisfied. The only difference is that the seller previously pro-
vided the guarantee. For example, Maytag could offer a guarantee 
on their washing machine. With a centralized platform connecting 
independent buyers and sellers, the third-party platform, rather than 
the seller, can offer the guarantee. This is an obvious benefit to buy-
ers, as it lowers their potential risk and therefore the cost of the trans-
action.206 But it also benefits the sellers as the buyer will now be 
willing to pay more.207 While providing a guarantee is a cost to the 
third party, it also carries the benefit of increasing the number of 
transactions on the platform, of which the third party usually gets a 
percentage. Furthermore, it enhances the platform’s brand, leading 
to further transactions and fee income.208 
A similar mechanism offered by centralized platforms is insur-
ance. The centralized platform may take out insurance policies on 
either party of the transaction or on both. This lowers the risk for 
either one of the transacting parties enough that they may now view 
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the benefits as exceeding the costs. For example, the car-sharing 
platform Turo allows those with underutilized cars to rent them to 
those who need a car.209 The risks to the owner of the car are high: 
Not only is their car at risk of damage, but an accident could incur 
liability charges from third parties as well.210 To alleviate these 
risks, Turo covers all vehicle owners with an additional $1 million 
liability insurance policy to protect against third-party claims for in-
juries and property damage as well as insuring the car up to the ac-
tual cash value due to collision and “comprehensive” causes.211 
Airbnb, the home-sharing platform, has a policy covering a host’s 
residence up to $1 million against damage by guests.212 
Centralized exchanges also use vetting and screening mecha-
nisms to block questionable or untrustworthy users from even enter-
ing their platform in the first place. This can take many forms, de-
pending on the service offered. One of the biggest concerns for ride-
sharing services is the safety of the riders. To block suspect drivers 
from being listed in the first place, services like Lyft perform both 
criminal and driving background checks.213 The criminal check will 
exclude anyone with a record of violent crimes, sexual offenses, 
theft, property damage, felonies, or drug-related offenses.214 The 
driving check will exclude anyone with certain moving violations, 
major violations (e.g., driving on a suspended license, reckless driv-
ing), and DUIs or other drug-related driving violations, as well as 
more serious driving-related infractions (e.g., hit-and-runs, felonies 
involving a vehicle).215 They will also confirm that the driver has a 
valid driver’s license and personal insurance that meets state re-
quirements. Screening can be done on the consumer of the product 
or service as well; RelayRides will not allow people to rent cars from 
others if they have any major violations on their driving record 
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(DUI, DWI, speeding over 20 mph, etc.) or even more than one mi-
nor violation in the last year.216 Other forms of vetting can be more 
subjective, such as Lyft’s Welcome Ride, also known as a personal-
ity check, where a seasoned Lyft driver must ride with a prospective 
driver and approve them before they can begin driving for Lyft.217 
There are also mechanisms to ensure that only qualified provid-
ers can participate in certain services.218 DogVacay, a service that 
connects dog owners with dog lovers who will watch their dogs, 
uses a system where prospective hosts must have their profiles ap-
proved before being listed as a dog sitter.219 Hosts can improve their 
search result rankings (making it more likely people will hire them) 
with badges earned by reading, watching training videos, and taking 
tests to improve their dog care knowledge.220 Similar to the Lyft per-
sonality check, they can also earn a badge by undergoing a phone 
interview with the company.221 
Centralized platforms acting as a payment clearing system are 
one of the oldest mechanisms used to facilitate transactions. When 
the central platform clears or verifies the payment between a buyer 
and a seller, neither party has to worry about things like fraudulent 
checks.222 Further, there is no handling of cash by people like ride-
sharing drivers, which reduces their personal security risk.223 Es-
                                                                                                             
 216 Relay Rides Support, What Are the Eligibility Requirements?, 
RELAYRIDES, http://support.relayrides.com/hc/en-us/articles/203991060-what-
are-the-eligibility-requirements (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 217 The Mentor Session, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drive/help/arti-
cle/1286071 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 218 How to Get Your Host Profile Approved, DOGVACAY, https://support.dog-
vacay.com/hc/en-us/articles/204758739-How-to-Get-Your-Host-Profile-Ap-
proved (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Earn Badges and Credibility!, DOGVACAY, https://support.dogva-
cay.com/hc/en-us/articles/204038075-Earn-Badges-And-Credibility- (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2015). 
 221 Tanz, supra note 24. 
 222 See, e.g., Sarah Mitroff, Uber vs Lyft: 9 things to consider before your first 
ride, CNET (Nov. 2, 2015, 09:06 AM), http://www.cnet.com/how-to/uber-lyft-
ride-share-ride-hailing/. 
 223 Id. 
862 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:830 
 
crow services, used by sites such as eBay, offer an additional meas-
ure of security.224 For new eBay sellers who do not yet have a selling 
record or reputation, eBay will automatically withhold payment 
from completed sales for a number of days or until the buyer con-
firms that he or she received the item as expected and leaves feed-
back.225 A similar transaction can be used for high-priced items us-
ing Escrow.com, eBay’s official escrow service.226 
“Big data” analytics is a relatively new mechanism that is unique 
to online, centralized exchanges.227 These mechanisms use com-
puter algorithms to monitor transactions and either block or flag sus-
picious activity that is then sent to a human employee to investi-
gate.228 For example, Airbnb’s platform tracks almost every trans-
action element of someone booking a host’s room including the list-
ing, profile, reservation, payment, all communication between the 
prospective guest and host, and the follow-up review.229 Using this 
information, Airbnb’s algorithms develop a “trust score” for each 
reservation.230 If the trust score is too low, it is automatically flagged 
for further investigation by their security team.231 Common items 
the system can flag or block include messages that mention the 
words “Western Union” (a sign the host is trying to circumvent 
Airbnb’s payment system232); a host and guest repeatedly booking 
rooms with each other (they may be trying to build up their reviews 
or ratings through fake bookings); or a new user booking very ex-
pensive rooms with a new host (raising the possibility of a money 
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laundering scheme).233 Airbnb undertakes such initiatives even 
though no law or regulation demands it because platforms like 
Airbnb possess the scale and incentive to build this infrastructure.234 
Airbnb currently has a team of approximately 80 people, with back-
grounds such as former government investigators and criminal pros-
ecutors, who are constantly reviewing suspicious activity and find-
ing new ways to combat fraud and abuse.235 
To summarize, when it comes to centralized or third-party mech-
anisms, there are already a number of well-established mechanisms 
in addition to emerging ones that are made possible by the advent of 
big data and analytics.236 These mechanisms work well because the 
third party is also a stakeholder in the transaction (usually because 
they receive a percentage of the transaction) and therefore have 
aligned interests to root out fraud and abuse.237 They also possess 
the scale and resources to offer mechanisms—such as guarantees, 
insurance, and even entire fraud investigation teams—that would be 
too expensive for individual actors.238 
While some may point out that these mechanisms do not directly 
increase the trust between the transacting parties, the end result is 
the same: Transactions that would not otherwise occur due to lack 
of trust are indeed facilitated.239 This is similar to the way personal 
referrals have worked in the traditional economy.240 Some people 
may not at first trust Bob the plumber to repair a sink, but if all their 
coworkers recommend him, then they may indeed choose to hire 
him. In such a case, they are leveraging the coworkers and their 
feedback as a third party, much as users leverage the network and 
feedback of other users on a centralized platform.241 In the end, the 
result is the same: The risk or cost of the transaction is lowered, al-
lowing it to take place and creating value for both parties.242 
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2.   PEER-TO-PEER MECHANISMS 
The second major category of online reputational systems in-
cludes mechanisms that directly increase the trust between the two 
parties involved in a transaction.243 These are feedback mechanisms 
that are truly peer to peer in character.244 Even though a third-party 
platform may make the existence of the mechanism possible, the 
value is created by interactions between the two transacting par-
ties.245 Before discussing these mechanisms, however, it should be 
noted that trust and reputation schemes are used in varying ways in 
a vast array of situations; there is no one-size-fits-all solution suita-
ble for all times and all contexts.246 
Ratings and reviews are one of the most popular peer-to-peer 
feedback mechanisms, and they rely on what is often referred to as 
collaborative sanctioning.247 These mechanisms have been around 
since the Web’s earliest days with the rise of eBay and Amazon, and 
they have already been discussed in detail previously.248 Therefore, 
only a little elaboration is needed here. 
Two important changes since the early days of web commerce 
have made peer-to-peer feedback mechanisms more ubiquitous and 
robust. First, the rise of Web 2.0 services over the past decade—
blogs, social networking platforms, smartphones and mobile apps—
have made it easier than ever for the public to have a voice in com-
mercial and noncommercial transactions.249 Importantly, the geolo-
cation technology embedded in many of these tools and platforms 
adds another layer of accountability by making it easier for consum-
ers and companies to interact and locate each other.250 
These technological developments have encouraged companies 
and other organizations (including governments) to become more 
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responsive to consumer and citizen demands.251 Many organizations 
also offer specific pages and social media services to address cus-
tomer service concerns.252 In particular, Facebook and Twitter are 
now frequent outlets for consumer complaints.253 Many consumers 
take to Twitter or Facebook to complain about shoddy service or to 
praise vendors.254 Many corporations have specific websites or 
Twitter accounts specifically for this purpose.255 
For example, in order to respond to consumer complaints 
promptly, most airlines (both major and minor) have established a 
presence on social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook, in 
addition to YouTube and Instagram.256 As consumers and firms ad-
just to these platforms, companies are able to engage in a much 
warmer relationship with their clientele.257 When things go wrong 
for the customer, however, these mechanisms are also the best way 
to get grievances resolved quickly and in real time.258 Twitter has 
proven to be a particularly powerful tool for consumers to complain 
about services and get prompt responses because of the public nature 
of these posts and because such complaints are readily searchable 
and sharable on the Internet.259 These feedback mechanisms also 
help bolster the quality of service through intense competition and 
constant innovation. 
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A second major change since the early days of the Web is that 
the recent explosion of the sharing economy—which depends upon 
many of the ingredients just discussed—has enabled even more di-
rect and instantaneous interaction between those supplying and de-
manding various services. The sharing economy relies heavily on 
ratings and reviews, using everything from simple star or point sys-
tems to detailed reviews from users.260 For example, ride-sharing 
companies employ some of the most extensive rating systems, 
whereby both the rider and the driver use a five-star system to rate 
each other after every ride.261 The companies can use the ratings to 
select drivers, and drivers can use the ratings to decide whether to 
accept riders. Companies like Lyft even have rules whereby drivers 
whose average rating falls below 4.6 (out of 5) stars will be at risk 
of being deactivated; similarly, a rider who rates a driver at three 
stars or lower will never be matched with that driver again.262 
In a peer-to-peer transaction, both parties attempt to gain infor-
mation about the other.263 Humans use various forms of signaling 
all of the time to try to convey something about their reputation or 
trustworthiness.264 For example, bankers usually dress profession-
ally and work in large, intimidating stone buildings to signal their 
soundness and trustworthiness in handling peoples’ hard-earned 
money. EBay sellers use multiple pictures in their listings, and 
Airbnb will send a professional photographer to hosts’ homes to 
showcase them appropriately.265 
Many online sharing platforms encourage their users to com-
municate directly with each other through the platform, which has 
been found to be a powerful way to gain trust and build reputations 
in online transactions and communities.266 RelayRide stumbled 
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upon this concept accidentally when they changed the way they 
transferred car keys from owner to renter.267 When the company first 
started, they had membership-card readers installed in every 
owner’s car.268 Renters could unlock and start a car by swiping their 
membership card, thus eliminating the need for the car owner to be 
present.269 But it soon became clear to RelayRide that, in order to 
grow efficiently, they would have to abandon having card readers 
installed in every car.270 Instead, renters and owners met face to face 
to hand off the keys.271 The human connection led to gains for both 
parties: Owners made fewer damage claims and both renters and 
owners reported higher satisfaction ratings.272 As the CEO of Re-
layRides, Andre Haddad, stated, “People strike up a conversation 
and realize they have something in common, which boosts trust and 
makes people feel accountable. They’re going to have to return this 
car to that person and look them in the eye.”273 For the same reasons, 
Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, and many other platforms require users to have 
a clear profile photo displayed with their accounts.274 
In fact, any information that confirms a person’s identity 
strengthens the trust and reputational ties between parties.275 That is 
why many sharing services prefer people to sign up using their Fa-
cebook account, as it is linked to their real identity.276 Lyft had orig-
inally allowed riders to sign up only with a Facebook account (but 
now also allows a valid cellphone number).277 The European ride-
sharing platform BlaBlaCar will also verify a driver’s phone num-
ber, email, and Facebook account along with real photos and 
names.278 Airbnb hosts can require that their guests have a Verified 
ID Badge, meaning they have verified their identity with the Airbnb 
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platform by uploading a driver’s license or passport photo or have 
connected other online accounts to their identity.279 Other items that 
platforms will verify include credit cards and bank accounts. A var-
iation of this is a quid pro quo policy where users have to share in-
formation about themselves if they want to see the same information 
from others in the network.280 
Finally, the ability for both users and providers of a good or ser-
vice to differentiate between individuals is another powerful mech-
anism that has gained use in the sharing economy.281 Feastly, a plat-
form connecting chefs willing to prepare and host a meal in their 
home with consumers willing to pay for the dining experience, al-
lows the host to accept or reject RSVPs from potential diners based 
on the information they provide or on what is included in their social 
network.282 Similarly, ride-sharing drivers can decide not to pick up 
passengers with low ratings.283 This mechanism allows both parties 
to decide with whom they want to interact.284 At the same time, they 
know when they do interact with another party, both are doing so 
voluntarily.285 
Generally speaking, the peer-to-peer mechanisms of building 
online trust and reputation in the sharing economy are very similar 
to those used in the physical world.286 Unsurprisingly, they are cen-
tered on establishing an identity and increasing communication be-
tween humans.287 Cliff Lampe of the University of Michigan’s 
School of Information notes that these mechanisms help establish 
new social norms in the process.288 In particular, he states that “[b]y 
providing feedback about behavior, penalizing negative actions, sig-
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naling desired outcomes, and rewarding users, reputation and rec-
ommender systems are providing socializing functions and becom-
ing valuable tools for organizing online environments.”289 In addi-
tion, Lampe argues that these tools are also essential to the growth 
of these environments because they both teach and enforce social 
norms within these spaces.290 They also socialize new users as they 
enter the system for the first time; “by providing information about 
users, rating systems can act as ‘cues’ or ‘signals’ in online commu-
nities, allowing users to reach common ground about each other and 
facilitating social interaction.”291In summary, there currently exists 
a host of mechanisms used to enhance trust and reputation in the 
sharing economy. These mechanisms continue to change and evolve 
to meet the needs of both buyers and sellers. Reputational systems 
have been heralded as the unsung heroes of the social Web.292 As 
Chrysanthos Dellarocas notes, “In some form or another, they are 
an integral part of most of today’s social web applications.”293 
Reputational systems make online commerce a safer and more 
secure experience.294 Some have gone so far as to regard trust and 
reputational systems as security mechanisms.295 Much of this secu-
rity is the result of reputational systems overcoming the information 
asymmetries of the past.296 However, just as different situations call 
for different security mechanisms, various sharing economy trans-
actions call for different levels of reputational systems. People may 
not need to thoroughly vet the person hired to mow the lawn, but 
they will certainly seek out more information and spend much more 
time reviewing a potential babysitter for their children. Thus, the 
nature of the exchange oftentimes dictates the reputational systems 
that individuals rely on to acquire the necessary information.297 
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C.   Addressing Problems Facing Reputational Mechanisms 
Of course, like security measures, these feedback mechanisms 
are not infallible. Critics have pointed to a number of Airbnb horror 
stories where guests have abused their host’s home.298 There have 
also been bad apples driving for Uber and Lyft.299 It should be noted, 
however, that the vast majority of these feedback mechanisms work 
well enough that worst-case scenarios are extremely rare: Airbnb 
transacted approximately two million reservations successfully be-
fore it had its first bad actor that ransacked a host’s home.300 Fol-
lowing the incident, Airbnb doubled their support staff, offered a 
24/7 helpline, and instituted a $50,000 insurance policy (which they 
shortly after raised to the current $1 million policy).301 But even as 
Airbnb has become much larger, host claims paid in 2013 totaled 
only 700 out of approximately six million guests, a claim rate of 
only 0.01 percent.302 
Thus, while “there are still many problems and challenges in 
both academic and practical trust/reputation systems,” experts on 
modern online feedback systems have concluded that “the success-
ful implementation of practical systems confirms the robustness of 
trust/reputation mechanisms.”303 The very fact that the sharing econ-
omy has evolved to the point it has today, with millions of parties 
transacting daily and having few problems, bolsters this conclusion. 
There is always room for improvement, of course. In particular, 
firms utilizing feedback mechanisms to facilitate commercial inter-
actions must always be on the lookout for users trying to rig those 
systems in their favor.304 As Dellarocas concludes, 
In general, it is impossible to design a totally manipulation-re-
sistant reputation system. No matter what mechanisms one puts in 
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place, creative and determined users are bound to find a way around 
them. For that reason, community administrators must constantly 
monitor such systems, organically evolving their designs.305 
As Paolo Massa notes, “[o]ne of the main concerns about repu-
tation systems and trust metrics is the fact that they can be attacked 
and gamed. What are often called ‘malicious users’ can hijack sys-
tems in order to get a personal advantage.”306 Then, citing specific 
research, Massa notes different recommendations for addressing 
these threats and for making a trust metric more attack-resistant.307 
We have also noted the use of fraud-detecting algorithms above.308 
Ongoing competition among existing and future online opera-
tors and sharing economy firms will encourage greater innovation 
and improvements in these systems. We have already seen signifi-
cant improvements in the efficiency and sophistication of feedback 
mechanisms from early Internet days.309 As long as they are allowed 
to, these systems will continue to evolve and solve new challenges. 
Some critics of the sharing economy argue that it will exacerbate 
racial tensions by making discrimination easier.310 A recent study 
conducted by Harvard Business School found that nonblack Airbnb 
hosts charge approximately 12 percent more than black hosts for an 
equivalent rental.311 While the study focuses on discrimination of 
suppliers rather than on the more traditional understanding of dis-
crimination against consumers, the study’s authors do note that there 
is evidence that the Internet has reduced racial discrimination in 
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other transactions, including car prices.312 Moreover, others have 
shown this to be true: The sharing economy offers more options to 
underserved communities and helps overcome the problem of 
bias.313 Airbnb has noted possible problems with the Harvard study, 
for example, the data are two years old and from only one city out 
of the 35,000 where they currently have hosts.314 In addition, as the 
study itself notes, much of the price discrepancies may be driven by 
differences in location.315 
With regard to instances in which discrimination has in fact his-
torically occurred, Lior Strahilevitz of the University of Chicago 
School of Law argues that 
an important potential upside of new reputational 
tracking technologies is their potential to displace 
statistical discrimination on the basis of race, gender, 
age, appearance, and other easily observable charac-
teristics. Reputation tracking tools . . . provide de-
tailed information about individuals, thereby reduc-
ing the temptation for decision makers to rely on 
group-based stereotypes.”316 
But more importantly, if irrational discrimination is preventing 
mutually beneficial trades within any sharing economy platform, it 
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would create a lucrative profit opportunity for entrepreneurs to ad-
dress.317 What’s more, there are already antidiscrimination laws on 
the books that could be used to address these problems as they 
arise.318 It is not necessary to try to alleviate discrimination prob-
lems through additional regulations focused on these valuable feed-
back mechanisms, whose resiliency depends on being able to adapt 
organically to address new challenges. 
Whether the concerns over feedback mechanisms are about bi-
ases or gaming, the relevant question is whether these mecha-
nisms—and the sharing economy that these mechanisms allow to 
flourish—improve consumer and producer welfare relative to the 
past. The rise and rapid growth of the sharing economy, and the fact 
that millions of people are voluntarily transacting with each other 
every day in these new ways, demonstrates that both consumers and 
producers are better off overall. By lowering the transaction costs 
between buyers and sellers, and aided by the reputational systems 
discussed above, the internet has paved the way for more trust and 
cooperation.319 It is important that the perfect not become the enemy 
of the good when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of these 
systems. Moreover, these systems will never reach a static end-
point; security and effectiveness are a never-ending process of re-
finement.320 
V. POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SHARING ECONOMY AND 
REPUTATIONAL FEEDBACK SYSTEMS 
A.   The Evaporating Rationales for Existing Regulations 
The growth and combination of information sharing, product 
and service review sites, and reputational feedback mechanisms pre-
sent profound ramifications for public policy. While consumer pro-
tection regulations were put in place in response to perceived market 
failures in the form of asymmetric information, they should be eval-
uated in light of their traditional effectiveness as well as changing 
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marketplace and technological circumstances.321 In both cases, the 
evidence supports policy reform. 
First, traditional consumer protection regulations have not 
served consumers well. As documented by Koopman, Mitchell, and 
Thierer, many consumer protection regulatory regimes diminish 
consumer welfare because they are “captured” by the affected inter-
ests and abused to their advantage.322 This results in barriers to entry 
and innovation as well as higher prices, reduced product quality, 
fewer choices, or some combination of all of the above.323 The taxi-
cab industry is a particularly vivid example of this situation.324 Bar-
riers to entry in the form of taxi medallions decrease competitive 
forces and remove incentives to better the taxi experience for us-
ers.325 
Second, the marketplace and the technological developments 
documented in this paper make it clear that information markets, 
reputational systems, and rapid ongoing innovation often solve 
problems more efficiently than regulation, especially when they are 
given a chance to do so.326 In a sense, technology has achieved what 
regulation promised to accomplish—or at least should have prom-
ised to accomplish—long ago.327 Indeed, it should be noted that reg-
ulations instituted in an effort to overcome information asymmetries 
involve their own costs and, in many cases, can exceed the initial 
claimed benefits.328 This is especially true as industries—and mar-
kets—continue to innovate and evolve over time.329 
Moreover, if asymmetric information really were as profound a 
problem as some have suggested, then the most logical response 
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would be remedies aimed at filling those information gaps and em-
powering consumers to make better decisions: indeed, Federal 
Trade Commission officials noted as much in the early 1980s: 
[T]here is usually an advantage in designing disclosure remedies 
that leave as large a role as possible to normal market forces, to re-
strict the market as little as possible. The goal should be not to spec-
ify the exact information to be disclosed and the exact manner in 
which it will be disclosed but to give sellers the proper incentives to 
make these decisions on their own.330 
Modern reputation tracking and feedback mechanisms, in com-
bination with the various online review sites and information ser-
vices, accomplish this objective by disclosing more information to 
consumers, thus putting them in a position to make better deci-
sions.331 Moreover, these emergent market developments ultimately 
leverage the dispersed knowledge of each individual user, rather 
than relying on the information that a single regulator is able to col-
lect.332 These information-sharing systems allow individuals to pro-
vide instant feedback regarding the quality of products and services, 
and they empower others to utilize this information in a way that 
traditional solutions never could.333 
Taken together, it should be clear that “[w]hen market circum-
stances change dramatically—or when new technology or competi-
tion alleviate the need for regulation—then public policy should 
evolve and adapt to accommodate these new realities.”334 In addi-
tion, because these systems are constantly evolving, and because 
new security challenges will always arise, it is dangerous for poli-
cymakers to impose a stagnant regulatory structure mandating cer-
tain aspects, procedures, or outcomes.335 
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B.   Leveling the Playing Field 
Even if many traditional consumer protection regulatory re-
gimes have failed to improve consumer welfare and are in need of 
reform, both policymakers and incumbent industries will argue that 
the innovators of the sharing economy are evading regulations that 
are still on the books.336 Those regulations include “licensing re-
quirements, price controls, service area requirements, marketing 
limitations, and technology standards.”337 
While this issue of the so-called level playing field represents a 
legitimate policy problem, policymakers should not remedy it by 
punishing new innovations and by simply extending old regulatory 
regimes to new technologies and sectors.338 Instead, policymakers 
should level the playing field by “deregulating down” to put simi-
larly situated competitors on an equal footing, not by “regulating 
up” to achieve parity.339 Older rules still faced by incumbents should 
be relaxed for entire industries as new actors and new technologies 
enter the market and otherwise preempt the need for the continued 
application of the traditional regulatory solutions.340 
Importantly, this does not mean that either new entrants or in-
cumbents will be unregulated. Numerous legal remedies, both civil 
and criminal, already exist to deal with accidents and bad behav-
ior.341 These remedies include “private insurance, contracts,” dis-
crimination laws, “torts, and product liability law[s].”342 The ad-
vantage of these ex post remedies is that they “do not discourage 
innovation and competition the way ex ante regulation does.”343 By 
trying to plan for “every hypothetical worst-case scenario, [many] 
preemptive [consumer protection] regulations actually [impede] 
many best-case scenarios,” and they harm consumer welfare in the 
process.344 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has documented how the sharing economy relies 
upon—and has helped spur the growth of—sophisticated reputa-
tional feedback mechanisms that facilitate online trust and com-
merce, overcoming many of the information asymmetries that 
seemed intractable to George Akerlof and others just a generation 
ago. In combination with online review services and other infor-
mation-sharing technologies enabled by the Internet, these reputa-
tional tools can help create more effective, and largely self-regulat-
ing, markets that provide more information to more individuals than 
ever before. However, it is unhelpful to point out shortcomings in 
these systems as a justification to continue to rely solely on tradi-
tional, formal mechanisms in light of these changing circumstances. 
As Strahilevitz argues, 
Reputation tracking cannot and will not solve all our problems. 
But neither can courts, police officers, or regulatory agencies. These 
various tools of maintaining social order work in concert, and they 
offer different competencies in varied contexts.345 
In other words, reputational systems will not completely obviate 
the need for other legal mechanisms. Nonetheless, the significance 
of reputational tracking and feedback systems should not be 
underestimated. Jason Tanz has observed, 
[W]e are entering a new era of Internet-enabled intimacy. This 
is not just an economic breakthrough. It is a cultural one, enabled by 
a sophisticated series of mechanisms, algorithms, and finely 
calibrated systems of rewards and punishments. It’s a radical next 
step for the person-to-person marketplace pioneered by eBay: a set 
of digital tools that enable and encourage us to trust our fellow 
human beings.346 
By facilitating greater trust while simulateously opening up new 
innovations and opportunities, these new Internet-based 
mechanisms promise to revolutionize modern marketplace 
interactions. This should force a reevaluation of traditional 
regulations aimed at addressing perceived asymmetric information 
market failures, regulations that have typically failed to improve 
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consumer welfare while also undermining innovation and 
competition. 
